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Cite as: Teresa A. Minnich, Welcome to the Family: A New Class of Cognizable 
Claims Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 4 SEVENTH CIRCUIT REV. 117 
(2008), at http://www.kentlaw.edu/7cr/v4-1/minnich.pdf. 
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Imagine that you are one of 25 million working women, or 
suppose that you are a husband and father who depends on your wife’s 
weekly paycheck to help provide basic support for your family.1 You, 
or your wife, are pregnant, and in addition to the menace of medical 
bills, your livelihood is further threatened because the new mother will 
have to take time off work in order to recover from her pregnancy. The 
compensation package at your, or your wife’s, place of work includes 
comprehensive non-occupational disability benefits, extending to 
disabilities such as venereal disease, athletic injuries, and even hair 
transplants, but the plan specifically excludes coverage for pregnancy 
and pregnancy-related medical conditions.2  
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2009, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; Bachelor of Arts, May 2004, College of Saint Benedict. 
1 Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 96th Cong., LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT, 1978, at 3 (Comm. Print 1980) 
(noting that 25 million women working in 1978 to provide basic support for their 
families).  
2 Legislative History of the PDA, at 2. G.E.’s program provided an employee 
who became disabled as a result of an eligible non-occupational injury or illness to 
receive 60% of his or her salary for a maximum of 26 weeks. Id. at 1.  
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In 1976, the female employees of General Electric (“G.E.”) 
faced precisely this situation.3  Forty-three of the then-current and 
former female G.E. employees banded together to challenge G.E.’s 
benefits program.4 Alleging that G. E.’s exclusion of pregnancy from 
an otherwise comprehensive list of covered non-occupational 
disabilities violated Title VII of the U.S. Code, these women argued 
their case all the way to the Supreme Court—and lost.5 
Utilizing the definition of discrimination developed in its 
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence,6 the Supreme Court of the 
United States determined that G.E.’s failure to provide disability 
benefits for pregnancy related work absences did not discriminate on 
the basis of sex.7 Congress reacted to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert by amending Title VII, explicitly 
providing, “the terms “because of sex” or “on the basis of sex” 
                                                 
3 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 129-130 (1976), overruled by 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2005).  
4 Legislative History of the PDA at 4. 
5 Gen. Elec., 429 U.S. at 138. The judge of the District Court of the Eastern 
District of Virginia and of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the 
female employees, holding that G.E.’s exclusion of pregnancy from its disability 
benefits plan constituted sex discrimination in violation of Title VII. Gilbert v. Gen. 
Elec. Co, 375 F. Supp. 367, 386 (E.D. Va. 1974), overruled by Gen. Elec. Co. v. 
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), overruled by Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2005); Gilbert v. Gen. Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661, 668 (4th Cir. 
1975), overruled by Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), overruled by 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2005). The Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of Title VII’s sex discrimination provisions overruled the 
holdings of 24 lower Federal courts. Legislative History of the PDA at 7. In addition, 
the Supreme Court refused to accord the force of law to EEOC Guidelines stating, 
“Disabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy, miscarriage, abortion, 
childbirth, and recovery therefrom are, for all job-related purposes, temporary 
disabilities and should be treated as such under any health or temporary disability 
insurance or sick leave plan available in connection with employment. (Benefits) 
shall be applied to disability due to pregnancy or childbirth on the same terms and 
conditions as they are applied to other temporary disabilities.” Gen. Elec. 429 U.S. at 
140-41 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (1975). 
6 Gen. Elec., 429 U.S. at 133. 
7 Id. at 145-46. 
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include . . . because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or 
related medical conditions.”8 Predictably, medical advances and 
technological innovation have forced courts to apply Title VII in a 
host of circumstances unconsidered by the express language of the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act and its legislative history. Causes of 
Action examined as potentially cognizable include claims related to 
maternal leave to accommodate breastfeeding,9 insurance coverage of 
contraceptives,10 and adverse employment action due to an 
employee’s decision to have an 11abortion.  
                                                
Recently, the Seventh Circuit became the first Federal Circuit 
Court of Appeals to recognize a cognizable Title VII claim where a 
woman alleged an adverse employment action taken in response to her 
pursuit of in vitro fertilization, a type of infertility treatment.12 In so 
doing, the Seventh Circuit created a possible conflict with the Eighth 
and Second Circuits, which have both refused to recognize a 
cognizable Title VII claim where an employer excludes infertility 
treatments from insurance benefits plans.13 Furthermore, the Seventh 
Circuit’s reasoning creates a murky distinction between child bearing 
capacity and fertility—although discrimination based on child bearing 
capacity violates Title VII as amended by the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act, discrimination based on fertility does not.14 
 
8 Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2005). 
9 See e.g. Barrash v. Bowen, 846 F.2d 927 (4th Cir. 1988); McNill v. N.Y.C. 
Dept. of Corrections, 950 F. Supp. 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Martinez v. N.B.C., Inc., 
49 F.Supp.2d 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Wallace v. Pyro Min. Co., 789 F.Supp. 867 
(W.D. Ky. 1990). 
10 See e.g. In re Union Pac. R.R. Emp. Prac. Lit., 479 F. 3d 936 (8th Cir. 2007); 
Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F.Supp.2d 1266 (W.D. Wash., 2001); Stocking v. 
AT&T Corp., 436 F.Supp.2d 1014 (W.D. Mo., 2006), reconsidered and vacated, 
2007 WL 3071825 (W.D.Mo. 2007). 
11 See e,g, Doe v. C.A.R.S. Protection Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 358 (3d Cir. 2008); 
Turic v. Holland Hospitality, Inc., 85 F.3d 1211 (6th Cir. 1996). 
12 Hall v. Nalco, 534 F.3d 644, 649 (7th Cir. 2008). 
13 Saks v. Franklin Covey, 316 F.3d 337 (2d Cir. 2003); Krauel v. Iowa, 95 
F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1996) 
14 Hall, 534 F.3d at 647-648. 
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Despite the possible conflict and the obscure distinction, the Seventh 
Circuit correctly determined that adverse employment action based on 
an employee’s pursuit of infertility treatments is gender discrimination 
under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. Furthermore, the Seventh 
Circuit correctly recognized its decision as distinguishable from those 
of the Second and Eighth Circuits. 
 
II.   THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT: GESTATION OF CIVIL 
RIGHTS PROTECTION 
 
A. Title VII and the PDA 
 
 The history of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act15 begins 
fourteen years before its birth, with the enactment of Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964. The relevant portion of Title VII states:  
 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer— 
 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or 
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with 
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.16 
 
A sex discrimination claim may arise under Title VII when an 
employer perpetrates an adverse employment action due to an 
employee’s gender. In other words, an employer violates Title VII if it 
makes hiring, firing, or promotional decisions based on an employee’s 
gender.17 However, Title VII also prohibits gender discrimination in 
                                                 
15 Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2005). 
16 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2005).   
17 Id. See e.g. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 580 
(1985)(affirming District Court’s finding of gender discrimination where petitioner 
was denied position in favor of male applicant with qualifications inferior to 
petitioner’s and where selection committee demonstrated gender bias); Sparks v. 
Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1154, 1562-1566 (11th Cir. 1987)(denying 
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the terms and conditions of employment, including compensation, 
benefits, job assignments, and transfers.18 In addition, a Title VII 
claim may proceed under either a disparate treatment or disparate 
impact theory.19 Overt or intentional conduct that treats an employ
in a manner which would be different but for the employee’s gen
represents disparate treatment discrimination.
ee 
der 
                                                                                                                  
20 In contrast, a facially 
neutral employment practice which is applied even-handedly to all 
employees but which, nonetheless, disproportionately impacts one 
gender violates Title VII under the disparate impact theory.21   
The legislative history of Title VII, so expansive with regard to 
the matter of race and color, is nearly mute with respect to the 
meaning of the term sex and the extent of protection thereby 
provided.22 Virginia Congressman Howard Smith, a staunch opponent 
of civil rights legislation, proposed amending Title VII to include the 
term “sex” late in the Congressional deliberations, just two days 
 
summary judgment on gender discrimination claim where employee was fired after 
refusing manager’s sexual advances and where male employee retained position). 
18 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) . See e.g. Ariz. Governing Committee for Tax 
Deferred Annuity and Deferred Compensation Plans v. Norris, 462 U.S. 1073, 1074 
(1983)(holding that a retirement benefits plan which paid lower monthly benefits to 
woman than to men who made the same contributions constituted sex discrimination 
in violation of Title VII); City of Los Angeles, Dept. of Water and Power, 435 U.S. 
702, 711 (1978)(holding that sex discrimination occurs where women are required to 
pay greater pension contributions than men due to females’ greater life expectancy) 
19 Texas Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 
(1981)(defining the elements of the prima facie Title VII disparate treatment claim); 
Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 448 (1982)(finding a violation of Title VII where 
employer administered examination had a disparate impact on black employees) 
20 See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 (indicating that burden of proving intentional 
discrimination remains with plaintiff). 
21 See Teal, 457 U.S. at 446 (noting that to establish a prima facie case of Title 
VII disparate impact, plaintiff must demonstrate “the facially neutral employment 
practice had a significantly discriminatory impact.”) 
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before the final vote.23 Congress adopted the amendment after a mere 
two hours of floor debate.24  
The Supreme Court attempted to interpret Congress’ 
prohibition of discrimination “because of…sex,” in General Electric v. 
Gilbert.25 According to the Supreme Court, the female G.E. 
employees failed to demonstrate a gender-based effect resulting f
the exclusion of pregnancy related disabilities from coverage.
rom 
er 
                                                
26 Rath
than representing an example of facial or pre-textual gender 
discrimination, the G.E. plan, in the Supreme Court’s view, was 
“nothing more than an insurance package, which covers some risks, 
but excludes others.”27 Since the male and female employees of G.E. 
received the exact same package covering the exact same categories of 
risk, the Supreme Court classified the benefits plan as facially 
 
23 Commentators speculate that the term was added in an attempt to derail 
passage of the Civil Right Act by adding a controversial category to the list of 
protected classes. Id. But see Jo Freeman, How “Sex” Got into Title VII: Persistent 
Opportunism as a Maker of Public Policy, 9 LAW & INEQ. 163 (1990-1991) (arguing 
that the sudden addition of “sex” to the protections of Title VII is better understood 
as an instance of persistent opportunism forcing major public policy innovation). In 
support of her theory, Ms. Freeman notes several important factors which argue 
against the addition of “sex” as a ploy to strike down the Civil Rights Act:  
1)The potential beneficiaries of the amendment—women—
had experienced lobbyists on the Hill and were not 
uninterested in the bill; 2) most Southerners had conceded 
defeat and gone home by Wednesday; the vote occurred on a 
Saturday, which is not Members’ favorite day to be in 
Washington; 3) the number of Members voting on the 
amendment—301—was larger than any other counted vote 
that day (the others ranged from 178 to 240); 4) other 
amendments which might “clutter up” the bill, including “sex” 
amendments to other titles, were voted down. 
Id. at 164-65. 
24 Freeman, supra note 23, at 163. 
25 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 133 (1976), overruled by Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2005).  
26 Id. at 137. 
27 Id. at 138. 
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neutral.28 The Supreme Court also failed to detect any discriminatory 
effect. In the court’s reasoning, G.E.’s failure to provide pregnancy-
related benefits did not change the parity of the benefits offered to men 
and women.29 Pregnancy-related illness and disabilities simply 
exemplified an “additional risk, unique to women,” that exceeded the 
benefits offered by the plan.30  
However brief its original consideration of the term, following 
the Supreme Court’s decision in General Electric, Congress amended 
Title VII to include the following definition of sex discrimination: 
The terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’ 
include, but are not limited to, because of or on the 
basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical 
conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, 
childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be 
treated the same for all employment related 
purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe 
benefit programs, as other persons not so affected 
by similar in their ability or inability to work, and 
nothing in section 2000e-2(h) of this title shall be 
interpreted to permit otherwise.31 
Now known as the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (“PDA”), this 
amendment to Title VII did not create any new rights or remedies.32 
Rather, the PDA is a rejection of the Supreme Court’s holding and 
reasoning in General Electric.33 Through the PDA, Congress 
expressly provided that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is p
se sex discrimination and a violation of Title V 34
er 
II.   
                                                 
28 Id.  
29 Id, at 139. 
30 Id. 
31 Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2005). 
32 Hall v. Nalco, 534 F.3d 644, 647 (7th Cir. 2008)(citing Newport News 
Shipping & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S.. 669, 678-679 (1983)). 
33 Newport News, 462 U.S. at 670. 
34 See Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 96th Cong., Legislative 
History of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, at 126 (Comm. Print 1980) 
(stating that “since only the female sex can bear children, any attempt to single out 
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B.  Supreme Court Interpretation of the PDA 
 
Since the amendment of Title VII by the PDA, the Supreme 
Court has had several occasions to consider the breadth and 
application of the PDA. Through Newport News v. EEOC and 
International Union v. Johnson Controls, the Supreme Court began to 
create an analytical and precedential framework to guide the 
interpretation and application of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. 
 In Newport News v. EEOC, the Supreme Court recognized the 
PDA as a rejection of the Court’s reasoning and holding in General 
Electric.35 Newport News, like General Electric, considered 
employees’ allegations of gender discrimination in the provision of 
employment benefits.36 In Newport News, the Supreme Court 
determined that the health insurance plan at issue violated Title VII by 
providing more comprehensive health care benefits to female 
employees than to male employees.37 Following the enactment of the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Newport News Shipping had revised 
its health care plan to cover pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical 
conditions of its female employees.38 The company did not, however, 
extend pregnancy benefits to the female spouses of its male 
employees.39  
The Supreme Court first noted that Title VII protects male as 
well as female employees from gender discrimination.40 Next, the 
                                                                                                                   
and discriminate against the condition of pregnancy is an inherent attempt to single 
out and discriminate against women.”).  
35 Newport News, 462 U.S. at 670. 
36 Id. at 671. 
37 Id. at 676. 
38 Id. at 671-72. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 682. The Supreme Court found no merit in the Petitioner, Newport 
News’s, argument that Congress intended to limit the Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act’s application to pregnant employees and that Newport News had no statutory 
obligation to provide pregnancy benefits to the wives of its employees. The Supreme 
Court reasoned that Congress’s focus on female workers did not “create a ‘negative 
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Supreme Court reasoned that Newport News had gifted its female 
employees with more favorable terms of employment than its male 
employees.41 Like the male employees in General Electric, the 
dependents of Newport’s female employees enjoyed protection from 
all categories of risk; in contrast, the female dependents of male 
employees lacked protection for pregnancy related illness. 42 Because 
Newport News had provided pregnancy disability insurance coverage 
for its female employees, but not for the spouses of its male 
employees, the company discriminated on the basis of pregnancy and 
violated Title VII.43 
 Unlike the benefits-received reasoning employed by the 
Supreme Court in General Electric, the reasoning embraced in 
Newport News is risk oriented.44 In Newport News, the Supreme Court 
recognized the General Electric dissenters’ interpretation of Title VII 
as the approved Congressional interpretation.45 Justice Brennan’s 
General Electric dissent argued that a policy which specifically 
excludes pregnancy related illness from a benefits package is facially 
                                                                                                                   
inference’ limiting the scope of the act to the specific problem that motivated its 
enactment” and determined that the question of differential treatment of dependents 
“should be resolved ‘on the basis of existing title VII principles.’” Id. at 680 (quoting 
Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 96th Cong., Legislative History of the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, at 42-43 (Comm. Print 1980).  
41 Id. at 683. 
42 Id. at 684. 
43 Id. The Supreme Court assumed only heterosexual couples exist, and noted, 
“since the sex of the spouse is always the opposite of the sex of the employee, it 
follows inexorably that discrimination against female spouses in the provision of 
fringe benefits is also discrimination against male employees.” Id. For a discussion 
of access to reproductive technology and same-sex couples, see Judith F. Daar, 
Accessing Reproductive Technologies: Invisible Barriers, Indelible Harms, 23 
BERKELEY J. OF GENDER, L. & JUST. 18 (2008). 
44 Compare Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 138-139, with Newport News 
462 U.S. at  678. 
45 Newport News, 462 U.S. at 678. The Newport court pointed to sections of 
the Legislative History of the PDA which expressed Congress’s favor for the 
reasoning and perception of the dissent. For example, the House Report stated, “It is 
the Committee’s view that the dissenting Justices correctly interpreted the Act.” Id. 
The Senate Report also quoted from the dissenting justices’ opinions. Id.  
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discriminatory.46 Contrary to the majority’s perception of gender 
neutral classifications based on pregnant and non-pregnant, Justice 
Brennan asserted that any classification based on pregnancy must be 
“at minimum, strongly ‘sex related.’”47 But for pregnancy, argued 
Justice Brennan, the plan “offers protection for all risks, even those 
that are ‘unique to’ men or heavily male dominated.”48 By excluding 
pregnancy, a uniquely feminine condition, from coverage, the General 
Electric disability program left a greater burden of risk upon the 
female employees than it did upon the male.49 Whereas men were 
protected from all categories of risk to which they could be subjected, 
women received only partial protection.50 
Adopting Justice Brennan’s analytical approach, the Newport 
court analyzed the comprehensiveness of coverage offered to males 
and females by evaluating the risks to which each gender remained 
exposed.51 Because the Newport plan refused coverage of pregnancy 
related illness to female dependents of male employees, the Court 
concluded that the plan “provide[d] more complete hospitalization 
coverage for the spouses of female employees than it did for the 
spouses of male employees,”52 and therefore “unlawfully [gave] 
married male employees a benefit package for their dependents that is 
less inclusive than the dependency coverage provided to married 
female employees.”53  
The Supreme Court’s decision in International Union is 
equally important to the Seventh Circuit’s analysis in Hall v. Nalco. 
Unlike Newport and General Electric, International Union concerned 
adverse employment actions perpetrated due to gender discrimination 
                                                 
46 Gen. Elec., 429 U.S. at 148 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
47 Id. at 149. 
48 Id. at 160. 
49 Newport News, 462 U.S. at 677-678. 
50 Id. at 678 (quoting Gen. Elec., 429 U.S. at 161-62 n.5 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting)). 
51 Id. at 683-684. 
52 Id.  
53 Id. at 684. 
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rather than unequal terms of employment.54 In International Union, 
male and female employees of the battery manufacturer, Johnson 
Controls, challenged the company’s fetal protection policy as a 
violation of Title VII.55  The fetal protection policy prohibited fertile 
women from performing jobs involving lead exposure with the stated 
goal of protecting the females’ unborn children.56 Despite credible 
scientific evidence demonstrating negative fetal effects due to the 
father’s exposure to lead, Johnson Controls allowed fertile men to risk 
their reproductive health.57  
The Supreme Court concluded, “Johnson Controls’ policy is 
not neutral because it does not apply to the reproductive capacity of 
the company’s male employees in the same way as it applies to that of 
the females.”58 Because it treated the reproductive capacities of each 
gender differently, the fetal protection policy could not be a 
classification based on “fertility alone.”59 Rather, the policy 
discriminated based on fertility and on gender and childbearing 
capacity.60 By targeting female reproductive capacity in particular, the 
policy discriminated on the basis of “potential for pregnancy,” and 
could not be considered facially neutral.61    
In Newport and International Union, the Supreme Court began 
the creation of an analytical and precedential framework to guide 
lower courts in their interpretation of the Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act. By repudiating the General Electric majority’s reasoning and by 
embracing Justice Brennan’s analytical approach, the Supreme Court 
has directed lower courts to focus on the risks to which gender 
classification remain vulnerable when analyzing the neutrality of 
employment benefits. In contrast, International Union creates 
                                                 
54 Int’l Union v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 192 (1991). 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 191-192. 
57 Id. at 197-198. 
58Id. at 199. 
59 Id. at 198. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 199. 
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Supreme Court precedent suggesting that employers may differentiate 
among employees according to fertility, so long as those 
differentiations occur in a gender neutral manner.    
 
III. THE BOUNCING BUNDLE OF JOY:  
A NEW CLASS OF CLAIMS IN THE PDA FAMILY 
 
In its recent decision, Hall v. Nalco, the Seventh Circuit 
became the first Circuit Court of Appeals to recognize a cognizable 
claim of Title VII sex discrimination where an employer allegedly 
perpetrated an adverse employment action in response to an 
employee’s pursuit of infertility treatments. More specifically, Ms. 
Hall, the plaintiff in Hall, sought leave from her job in order to 
undergo in vitro fertilization, a surgical impregnation procedure. 
According to Ms. Hall’s allegations, her employer terminated her as a 
result of her request for leave.   
 
A. The Problem of Infertility 
 
Infertility is a common problem that affects approximately 
10% of all couples in the United States.62 Within that 10% of infertile 
couples, 40% of all cases are attributable to male infertility factors, 
and a corresponding 40% of cases are attributable to female infertility 
factors.63 Doctors attribute the remaining 20% of cases to a 
combination of male and female infertility issues.64 According to the 
medical community, infertility is “a disease or condition of the 
reproductive system often diagnosed after a couple has had one year of 
unprotected, well-timed intercourse, or if the woman has suffered from 
multiple miscarriages.”65 For couples who wish to conceive despite 
                                                 
62 Bradley J. Voorhis, In Vitro Fertilization, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 379, 379 
(2007). 
63 Bentley, supra note 10, at 394-395. 
64 Id. 
65 Elizabeth A. Pendo, The Politics of Infertility: Recognizing Coverage 
Exclusions as Discrimination, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 293, 297 (2004-2005). 
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reduced fertility of either the male or female form, medical assistance 
exists in the form of hormone treatments, prescription drugs, and 
corrective surgeries such as the repair or removal of blockages from 
fallopian tubes.66 
 Eighty-five to ninety percent of infertility cases are able to 
conceive using the treatments already described.67 The remaining 10–
15 % of cases, however, may turn to more drastic measures such as 
surgical impregnation procedures.68 Surgical impregnation procedures 
come in a variety of forms, including in vitro fertilization, Gamete 
Intrafallopian Transfer (GIFT), and Zygote Intrafallopian Transfer 
(ZIFT).69 The procedures are defined by the manner in which 
fertilization is attempted and the location in which implantation of the 
fertilized egg occurs.70 With in vitro fertilization, for instance, the 
female’s eggs are surgically extracted and then fertilized by the male’s 
sperm in a laboratory.71 The embryos resulting from fertilization are 
then placed in the female’s womb.72 Many gender specific infertility 
problems have prescribed treatments that must be performed on the 
particular individual suffering from the problem.73 Surgical 
impregnation procedures, although performed only on women, can be 





                                                 
66 Id. at 299-300. 
67 Id. at 300. 
68 Id. 
69 Bentley, supra note 10, at 396. 
70 Id. 
71 MARK H. BEERS, MERCK MANUAL OF MEDICAL INFORMATION 1418-1419 
(2d Home ed., Pocket Books 2003). 
72 Id.  
73 See, e.g., Stuart S. Howards, Treatment of Male Infertility, 332 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 312, 313-316 (1998); Howard S. Jones & James P. Toner, The Infertile 
Couple, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1710, 1711-1712 (1993). 
74 See Howards, supra note 73, at 313-316. 
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B. Hall v. Nalco 
  
Ms. Hall began working for Nalco in 1997, becoming a sales 
secretary in 2000.75 In March 2003, Ms. Hall requested a leave of 
absence to undergo in vitro fertilization.76 This leave was approved by 
her direct supervisor and lasted from March 24 through April 21.77 
Unfortunately, Ms. Hall’s first attempt to become pregnant through 
reproductive technology failed.78 Upon returning to work, Ms. Hall 
informed her supervisor that she would be requesting additional leave 
in order to undergo the in vitro fertilization procedure again.79  
 Beginning in January of 2003, several months prior to Ms. 
Hall’s initial request for leave, Nalco began preparations for a 
consolidation of its sales offices.80 Sometime between that January 
and July of 2003, Nalco determined that the consolidated sales offi
would require only one secretary.
ces 
                                                
81 Since each office had its own 
secretary, one of them would have to be let go following completion 
of the consolidation.82 After Ms. Hall returned from her first leave and 
requested additional leave to again attempt in vitro fertilization, Ms. 
Hall was terminated.83  
 In response to her termination, Ms. Hall brought a gender 
discrimination claim under Title VII as amended by the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act, alleging that Nalco terminated her because of her 
request for leave to undergo in vitro fertilization treatments.84 To 
demonstrate a causal link between her attempts to become pregnant 
and her termination, Ms. Hall offered several statements from her 
 









84 Id. at 645. 
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supervisor, which asserted that the termination was in Ms. Hall’s “best 
interest due to [her] health condition.”85 In addition, Ms. Hall pointed 
to notes regarding the content of a meeting between the supervisor and 
the employee relations manager which specifically mentioned her 
infertility treatments.86 Specifically, the notes read, “missed a lot of 
work due to health,” and, “absenteeism-infertility treatments.”87  
 Without reaching the merits of Ms. Hall’s claim, the District 
Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted summary judgment 
for the defendant, Nalco.88 Concluding that infertile women are not a 
protected class under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act,89 the District 
Court held that Ms. Hall could not demonstrate sex discrimination 
because infertility is a gender neutral condition.90 Ms. Hall appealed 
the District Court judgment, and the Seventh Circuit reversed, stating, 
“Because adverse employment actions taken on account of 
childbearing capacity affect only women, Hall has stated a cognizable 
sex-discrimination claim under the language of the PDA.”91       
                                                 




89 Id. at 645.  
90 Id. In so holding, the District Court called two previous Northern District of 
Illinois cases into question. See Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F. Supp. 1393 
(N.D. Ill. 1994); Erickson v. Bd. of Governors of State Coll. and Univ. for 
Northeastern Ill. Univ., 911 F. Supp. 316 (N.D. Ill. 1995). Both of these cases 
involved female employees who utilized sick days or other leave in order to undergo 
infertility treatments. In each case, the female was terminated and brought suit under 
the PDA alleging that an adverse employment action had occurred. And in both 
cases, the District Court found their claims cognizable, arguing that the PDA extends 
protection to potential pregnancy. See Pacourek, 858 F.Supp. at 1401; Erickson, 911 
F.Supp. at 319. The Court also argued that a female undergoing fertility treatments 
should be included in the class of women who are potentially pregnant. Pacourek, 
858 F.Supp. at 1403; Erickson, 911 F.Supp. at 320.  
91Hall, 534 F.3d at 645. Although Ms. Hall based her case on the argument that 
infertile women are a protected class under the PDA, the Seventh Circuit analyzed 
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By so stating, the Seventh Circuit classified the pursuit of infertility 
treatments as a medical condition related to pregnancy within the 
meaning of the PDA and recognized an adverse employment action 
based on an employee’s pursuit of infertility treatments as a 
cognizable claim Title VII claim.92  
 
IV.  MAKING ROOM FOR THE NEW ARRIVAL: HALL V. NALCO AND 
CONTEMPORARY PDA JURISPRUDENCE  
 
Although likely to face a warm reception from champions of a 
liberal interpretation of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (“PDA”),93 
the Seventh Circuit’s decision to recognize pursuit of infertility 
treatments as a medical condition related to pregnancy causes some 
strain in the context of contemporary PDA jurisprudence. First, the 
Seventh Circuit’s holding creates a possible conflict with the Second 
and Eighth Circuits, both of which have previously refused to 
recognize a cognizable claim arising from the exclusion of infertility 
treatments from insurance coverage.94 Second, in articulating and 
justifying its decision, the Seventh Circuit created a murky distinction 
between fertility related medical conditions, which do not give rise to 
a cognizable claim under the PDA, and childbearing related medical 
conditions, which can give rise to a cognizable claim under the PDA.95 
Despite the seeming obscurity of this distinction, Supreme Court 
precedent, the legislative history of the PDA, and logic indicate that 
                                                 
92 Id. at 646. 
93 See Pendo, supra note 65, at 343 (arguing that comprehensive insurance 
coverage of infertility treatments would lead to better, more humane, and more cost-
effective treatments); Julie Manning Magid, Contraception and Contractions: A 
Divergent Decade Following Johnson Controls, 41 AM. BUS. L.J. 115, 142-144 
(2003) (advocating a broad interpretation of the PDA). But see Katherine E. Abel, 
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act and Insurance Coverage for Infertility 
Treatment: An Inconceivable Union, 37 CONN. L. REV. 819, 849-850 (2005) (urging 
a more complete understanding of the moral and legal implications of infertility 
treatments before expanding PDA protection).  
94 Saks v. Franklin Covey, 316 F.3d 337 (2d Cir. 2003); Krauel v. Iowa, 95 
F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1996). 
95Hall, 534 F.3d at 647-648. 
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the Seventh Circuit correctly determined that adverse employment 
action based on an employee’s pursuit of infertility treatments is 
cognizable gender discrimination under the PDA. To the extent that 
the Seventh Circuit’s opinion is inconsistent with those of the Eighth 
and Second Circuits, the Seventh Circuit has chosen the more logical 
approach. 
 
A.   Establishing the New-Born Identity: The Distinction Between 
Fertility and Childbearing Capacity 
 
Given the express language of the PDA96 and Supreme Court 
precedent suggesting that infertility is a gender neutral characteristic 
lacking protection under the PDA97, Ms. Hall’s claim does not 
immediately appear as the ideal candidate for coverage under the 
PDA. In the District Court, Hall alleged that she was “a member of a 
protected class, female with a pregnancy related condition, 
infertility.”98 The District Court promptly dismissed her claim on 
summary judgment, stating that infertile women are not a protected 
class under the PDA because infertility is a gender neutral condition.99 
Although accepting the Supreme Court’s implication that infertility 
discrimination is not prohibited by the PDA, the Seventh Circuit 
nevertheless found the District Court’s emphasis on “infertility alone” 
was misplaced within the factual context of Ms. Hall’s claim.100 
According to the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning, Ms. Hall’s claim did not 
allege infertility discrimination, but rather discrimination on the basis 
of childbearing capacity, a gender-specific trait qualifying as a medical 
                                                 
96 Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2005). 
97 Int’l Union v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 198 (1991). 
98 Hall, 534 F.3d at 646. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 648. Despite the Supreme Court precedent provided by International 
Union, commentators continue to argue that infertility should receive protection 
under Title VII as amended by the PDA. See Pendo, supra note 65, at 336-338 
(arguing that infertility is a gender-specific trait because it is still seen as a “woman’s 
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condition related to pregnancy under the PDA.101 The Seventh Circuit 
thereby reached two separate conclusions: 1) childbearing capacity is 
separate and distinct from fertility, and 2) childbearing capacity is a 
medical condition related to pregnancy and, therefore, a protected 
classification under Title VII as amended by the PDA.   
The distinction between childbearing capacity and fertility at 
first appears murky. Fertile, in medical terminology, means “fruitful; 
having the capacity to reproduce.”102 Logically, a female who is 
capable of reproducing, and who is therefore fertile, must be capable 
of bearing a child. Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit properly 
recognized childbearing capacity as gender specific while continuing 
to maintain the gender neutrality of infertility.  
Although the Seventh Circuit referred to Newport News  in 
support of its recognition of the PDA as a Congressional overruling of 
General Electric,103 the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in support of the 
distinction between childbearing capacity and fertility relied almost 
exclusively on International Union.104 The Seventh Circuit reiterated 
the Supreme Court’s finding that a fetal protection policy which 
classifies on the basis of gender and childbearing capacity rather than 
fertility alone violates Title VII.105 According to the Seventh Circuit, 
“As Johnson Controls illustrates, even where (in)fertility is at issue, 
the employer conduct complained of must actually be gender neutral 
to pass muster.”106 An action undertaken by an employer based on an 
employee’s childbearing capacity, however, can never be gender 
neutral: the Seventh Circuit argued, “Employees terminated for taking 
time off to undergo IVF—just like those terminated for taking time off 
to give birth or receive other pregnancy-related case—will always be 
                                                 
101 Hall, 534 F.3d at 648-649. 
102 DORLAND’S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 684 (Elsevier, 30th ed. 
2003). 
103 Hall, 534 F.3d at 647 (citing Newport News v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 676-
678 (1983)). 
104 Id. at 648-649. 
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women.”107 Therefore, the Seventh Circuit’s distinction between 
childbearing capacity and fertility is best understood as a reiteration of 
the Supreme Court’s suggestion that an employer may differentiate 
between employees on the basis of fertility, so long as the employer 
does so in a gender neutral manner. Differentiation based on 
employees’ childbearing capacity is differentiation based on fertility; 
however differentiation based on childbearing capacity is not a gender 
neutral differentiation based on fertility and it therefore violated Title 
VII as amended by the PDA.   
Having reached the logic behind the Seventh Circuit’s 
differentiation between childbearing capacity and fertility, one must 
still consider whether childbearing capacity is appropriately 
considered a medical condition related to pregnancy. The PDA states, 
“The terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’ include, but are 
not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or 
related medical conditions . . .”108 The PDA does not define related 
medical condition. Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s only guidance 
appears by implication in International Union, where the Supreme 
Court appeared to suggest that employment discrimination on the basis 
of fertility is permissible under Title VII and the PDA so long as the 
discrimination is truly gender neutral.109 Clearly, there is a causal 
chain between fertility treatments and pregnancy, but the Circuit 
Courts of Appeal rather unanimously require more than a simple 
causal chain to establish a medical condition related to pregnancy.110  
                                                 
107 Id. at 648-649. 
108 Pregnancy Discrimination Act 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) 
109 Int’l Union v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 198 (1991). The Second, 
Seventh, and Eighth Circuits all appear to accept this implication as sound and 
binding precedent. E.g., Saks v. Franklin Covey, 316 F.3d 337, 346 (2d Cir. 2003); 
Hall, 534 F.3d at 638; Krauel v. Iowa, 95 F.3d 674, 679 (8th Cir. 1996). 
110 E.g. Fleming v. Ayers & Assoc.’s, 948 F.2d 993, 997 (6th Cir. 1991) 
(medical related conditions under the PDA do not encompass adverse employment 
actions based on the medical condition of the child simply because the condition is 
present at birth); Troupe v. May Dept. Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 1994) 
(affirming grant of summary judgment to employer who terminated female 
employee who arrived late due to morning sickness); In re Union Pac. R.R. 
Employment Practices Litig., 479 F.3d 936, 941 (8th Cir. 2007) (rejecting argument 
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The Eighth Circuit in particular has taken a conservative view 
of what constitutes a medical condition related to pregnancy and 
childbirth.111 In International Union, the Supreme Court found sex 
discrimination because the fetal protection policy was classified based 
on childbearing capacity and potential for pregnancy.112 Heedless of 
the inclusion of “potential for pregnancy” within the PDA, the Eighth 
Circuit refuses to extend PDA coverage to issues and conditions which 
predate pregnancy. 113 If the Eighth Circuit clings to this line of 
reasoning, it will likely refuse PDA protection for claims such as Ms. 
Hall’s. But if the Eighth Circuit realizes the error of its approach, or at 
least decides to temper that approach upon recalling the decision in 
International Union, it should reach the same conclusion which the 
Seventh Circuit reached in Hall.     
Even if the Eighth Circuit wished to perpetuate its refusal to 
class use of contraceptives as a medical condition related to 
pregnancy, the Eighth Circuit could still reach the Seventh Circuit’s 
holding that pursuit of surgical impregnation procedures is a medical 
condition related to pregnancy in the context of adverse employment 
actions. First, although the in vitro fertilization treatments received by 
Ms. Hall necessarily occur prior to conception, just like the 
contraceptives for which the plaintiffs sought insurance coverage in In 
                                                                                                                   
that causal chain between contraceptives and pregnancy entitled petitioner to Title 
VII relief); McNill v. N. Y.C. Dept. of Correction, 950 F. Supp.564, 570-571 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (limiting “related medical conditions” to incapacitating conditions 
in the mother for which medical care is usual and normal). 
111 In re Union, 479 F.3d at 941. For a brief additional discussion of the Eighth 
Circuit’s decision in In re Union, see Harvard Law Review Association, 
Employment Law—Title VII—Eighth Circuit Holds That Benefits Plans Excluding 
All Contraceptives Do Not Discriminate Based on Sex—In Re Union Pacific 
Railroad Employment Practices Litigation, 479 F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 2007), Reh’g and 
Reg’g En Banc Denied, No. 06-1706 (8th Cir. May 23, 2007), 121 HARV. L. REV. 
1447 (2008). For a discussion regarding insurance coverage of contraceptives 
generally, see Pendo, supra note 65, at 293-343; Ernest F. Lidge III, An Employer’s 
Exclusion of Coverage for Contraceptive Drugs is Not Per Se Sex Discrimination, 
76 TEMP. L. REV. 533 (2003).  
112 Int’l Union, 499 U.S. at 198-199. 
113 In re Union, 479 F.3d at 939. 
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re Union, the treatments are conceptually different from 
contraceptives. Second, in vitro fertilization and similar surgical 
impregnation procedures are less open to characterization as gender-
neutral than is contraceptive use. 
In addition to the temporal disconnection between 
contraceptive use and pregnancy, the Eighth Circuit also identified a 
conceptual dissonance between the issues, arguing, “Contraception is 
not a medical treatment that occurs when or if a woman becomes 
pregnant; instead contraception prevents pregnancy from even 
occurring.”114 In contrast, surgical impregnation procedures are 
undertaken with the specific intent of instigating pregnancy rather than 
preventing it. A woman who undergoes in vitro fertilization has a clear 
intention of becoming pregnant. As a result, fertility treatments such as 
in vitro fertilization are much more closely related to the concept of 
potential pregnancy than are contraceptives.  
In In re Union, the Eighth Circuit also asserted that 
contraception, like infertility, is a gender-neutral term.115 Men and 
women do suffer equally from infertility,116 and both men and women 
may seek to avoid an unplanned pregnancy by utilizing contraceptives. 
However, only women can undergo surgical impregnation procedures. 
Therefore, as the Seventh Circuit noted, only women will ever request 
leave of absence from their employer for the purpose of undergoing 
infertility treatments of this type, and only women will be the subject 
of adverse employment actions taken in response to those requests.117   
In any event, the Eighth Circuit’s stark refusal to consider pre-
pregnancy conditions as potential medical conditions related to 
                                                 
114 Id. at 942. 
115 Id. at 943. The dissent argues that contraception is far less gender-neutral 
than the Eighth Circuit would claim and asserts that the burden of excluding any 
contraceptive, including surgical forms performed only on men, falls on women 
because women remain the sole gender capable of becoming pregnant. Id. at 945 
(Bye, J. dissenting). 
116 James F. Donovan & Jay I. Sandlow, The Infertile Couple, 330 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 1154, 1154 (1994) (stating that male infertility is a primary or secondary factor 
in fifty percent of infertile couples) 
117 Hall v. Nalco, 534 F.3d 644, 648-649 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 137
21
Minnich: Welcome to the Family: A New Class of Cognizable Claims Under the
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2008
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 4, Issue 1                           Fall 2008 
 
pregnancy is inappropriate in light of both the Supreme Court 
precedent already cited and the legislative history of the PDA. The 
PDA was drafted and passed in response to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in General Electric, and for the stated purpose of countering 
the societal perspective of women as temporary members of the 
workforce who would cease working as soon as pregnancy and a 
family occurred.118 This perception affected not only pregnant women 
but every woman perceived by her employer as potentially 
pregnant.119 Employers hesitated to advance women to positions and 
salaries of importance due to the belief that the women would not be 
in the workplace for more than a few years.120 Recognizing this 
prevalent societal view, the enacting Congress understood that 
forbidding an employer to discriminate against pregnant women is a 
useless stopgap if the employer remains free to discriminate against 
women who the employer knows or suspects to be attempting to 
become pregnant.121 
If, based on logic, legislative history, and Supreme Court 
precedent, it is essential to include potentially pregnant women within 
the protection of the PDA, it makes no sense to distinguish between 
potentially pregnant women based on whether they intend to become 
pregnant through natural means or with the assistance of reproductive 
technology. Given the legislative history and purpose surrounding the 
PDA and the Supreme Court’s recognition of PDA coverage of 
potential pregnancy, the Seventh Circuit created a valid distinction 
between childbearing capacity and fertility and correctly classified 





                                                 
118 Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 96th Cong., Legislative History 
of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, at 3 (Comm. Print 1980). 
119 Id. at 62. 
120 Id. at 3. 
121 Id. at 62-63. 
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B.  Keeping Peace Between the Siblings: Distinguishing Hall from 
Saks and Krauel 
 
Although the Seventh Circuit is the first Circuit Court of 
Appeals to recognize a cognizable claim where an adverse 
employment action arises from a woman’s pursuit of surgical 
impregnation procedures, two other Circuit Courts have considered a 
closely related issue: whether gender discrimination occurs where an 
employer excludes insurance coverage for surgical impregnation 
procedures.122 Neither the Eighth Circuit, which considered the 
question in Krauel v. Iowa, nor the Second Circuit, which faced the 
issue in Saks v. Franklin Covey, extended the protection of the PDA to 
women undergoing the procedures.123 As the Seventh Circuit points 
out, neither the Eighth nor the Second Circuits considered the precise 
question at issue in Hall.124 Furthermore, to the extent that the Seventh 
Circuit’s opinion is inconsistent with those of the Eighth and Second 
Circuits, the Seventh Circuit has chosen the more logical approach. 
In Krauel, the Eighth Circuit considered the PDA claim of a 
female respiratory therapist who had been denied coverage under her 
company plan for a surgical impregnation procedure.125 The insurance 
policy in question excluded not just treatment of female infertility 
problems but treatment of male infertility as well.126 The Eighth 
Circuit construed the terms of the PDA narrowly, determining that the 
general term “related medical condition” should be understood as 
referring to the specific terms of pregnancy and childbirth and should 
not be extended outside of those contexts.127 Based on this restrictive 
                                                 
122 Saks v. Franklin Covey, 316 F.3d 337, 345 (2d Cir. 2003); Krauel v. Iowa, 
95 F.3d 674, 679 (8th Cir. 1996). 
123 Saks, 316 F.3d at 345; Krauel, 95 F.3d at 679. 
124 Hall v. Nalco, 534 F.3d 644, 646 (7th Cir. 2008). 
125 Krauel, 95 F.3d at 675. Specifically, Ms. Krauel underwent GIFT, a 
surgical infertility treatment procedure in which the ova and sperm are mixed in a 
Petri dish. The mixture is then inserted in the fallopian tube to allow natural 
fertilization to occur. Id. at 676, 676 n.3. 
126 Krauel v. Iowa, 95 F.3d 674, 676 (8th Cir. 1996). 
127 Id. at 679. 
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interpretation of “related medical conditions,” the Eighth Circuit found 
fertility treatments to be too temporally and conceptually disconnected 
from pregnancy and childbirth to be a cognizable claim under the 
PDA; the Court argued, “[p]regnancy and childbirth, which occur after 
conception, are strikingly different from infertility, which prevents 
conception.”128 
Similarly, in Saks, the Second Circuit addressed the gender 
discrimination claim of a female employee who had been denied 
insurance coverage for a surgical impregnation procedure.129 Unlike 
the policy at issue in Krauel, however, the policy which denied the 
Ms. Saks coverage did cover some fertility treatments. Ovulation kits, 
oral fertility drugs, medically-necessary penile prosthetic implants, 
and nearly all surgical infertility treatments other than surgical 
impregnation procedures received insurance coverage.130 The policy 
expressly excluded coverage for surgical impregnation procedures, 
including artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization (“IVF”), and 
embryo and fetal implantation.131 Ms. Saks was denied coverage for 
an IVF attempt and related prescription drug therapy.132 At the Secon
Circuit, Ms. Saks argued that the insurance plan violated the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act by providing less comprehensive 
coverage for surgical treatments addressing female infertility than it 
provided for non-pregnancy related illness.
d 
                                                
133 Although recognizing 
 
128 Id.  
129 Saks v. Franklin Covey, 316 F.3d 337, 341 (2d Cir. 2003). 
130 Id. Specifically, the plan covered surgical procedures including those to 
remedy variococeles (varicose veins in the testicles leading to low sperm count), 
blockages of the vas deferens (also a procedure performed on males), endometriosis, 
and tubal occlusions. Id.  
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 342. Saks also raised a Title VII argument, alleging that the plan 
violated Title VII by providing “incomplete coverage for surgical treatments for 
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that the PDA “clearly embraces more than pregnancy itself,”134 the 
Second Circuit rejected Saks’ argument, stating: 
 
Including infertility within the PDA’s protection as a “related 
medical condition[]” would result in the anomaly of defining a 
class that simultaneously includes equal numbers of both sexes 
and yet is somehow vulnerable to sex discrimination…[W]e 
hold that infertility standing alone does not fall within the 
meaning of the phrase “related medical conditions” under the 
PDA.135 
 
Like the Eighth Circuit, the Second Circuit differentiated its 
case from International Union. According to the Second Circuit’s 
reasoning, unlike the fetal protection policy in International Union, 
the Franklin Covey insurance plan achieved a gender neutral 
discrimination based on fertility alone.136 Even though the Franklin 
Covey insurance plan covered all surgical infertility treatments 
performed on males but only some of those performed on females, the 
Second Circuit found the plan to be gender neutral because the 
excluded surgical impregnation procedures may treat either male or 
female infertility.137 The Second Circuit concluded, ““[B]ecause the 
exclusion of surgical impregnation procedures disadvantages infertile 
male and female employees equally, Saks’s claim does not fall within 
the purview of the PDA.”138 
Despite the seeming inconsistency between the Eighth and 
Second Circuits and the Seventh Circuit, Hall confronts the decisions 
of the Eighth and Second Circuits peripherally and brushes them aside 
casually.139 The Seventh Circuit found little fault with Saks and 
Krauel. Indeed, the courts reached several common conclusions. The 
                                                 
134 Id. at 343. 
135 Id. at 346. 
136Id.; See also Int’l Union v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 198 (1991). 
137 Saks, 316 F.3d at 347. 
138 Id. at 346. 
139 Hall v. Nalco, 534 F.3d 644, 648 (7th Cir. 2008).. 
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Seventh Circuit accepts the Eighth and Second Circuit’s assertions that 
classifications based on fertility alone are gender neutral and therefore 
beyond the reach of the PDA.140 In fact, the Seventh Circuit even cites 
favorably to some of the core reasoning of Saks, noting the logic 
behind the Second Circuit’s contention that the PDA cannot extend 
protection to a classification simultaneously including equal numbers 
of both genders and remaining vulnerable to gender discrimination.141 
The questions considered by the three courts are similar in a general 
sense—all three questions considered whether a woman alleging 
discrimination based on her pursuit of infertility treatments states a 
cognizable claim under the PDA.142 Furthermore the Seventh Circuit 
appears to reach a result that is diametrically opposed to those of the 
Eighth and Second Circuits: the Seventh Circuit finds the claim 
cognizable, while the Second and Eighth Circuits refuse to do so.143  
Yet, the Seventh Circuit directly conflicts with the Eighth and Second 
Circuits on only two points: the application of the PDA to potential 
pregnancy and the application of International Union v. Johnson 
Controls to the facts of the case. 
On the question of the application of the PDA to potential 
pregnancy, the Seventh Circuit explicitly disagrees with the Eighth 
Circuit.144  With respect to this issue, the Eighth Circuit asserted that 
the PDA applies only after conception.145 The Second Circuit reserved 
                                                 
140 Id. 
141 Id. 
142Saks, 316 F.3d at 340-41; Hall, 534 F.3d at 645; Krauel v. Iowa, 95 F.3d 
674, 675-676 (8th Cir. 1996).  
143 Saks, 316 F.3d at 346; Hall, 534 F.3d at 649; Krauel, 95 F.3d at 679-680. 
144 Hall, 534 F.3d at 648, n. 1. 
145 Krauel, 95 F.3d at 679. This aspect of the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning 
became an integral part of that court’s ruling in In re Union, where the Eighth 
Circuit refused to require insurance coverage of contraceptives. In re Union Pac. 
R.R. Prac. Lit. 479 F. 3d 936, 942 (8th Cir. 2007). Interestingly, the Eighth Circuit’s 
assertion is at odds with its own case law. In Walsh v. National Computer Systems, 
Inc., 332 F.3d 1150, 1160 (8th Cir. 2003), the Eighth Circuit upheld a jury verdict 
awarded in response to a PDA claim brought by a woman who was “discriminated 
against. . .because she is a woman who had been pregnant, had taken a maternity 
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judgment on the issue.146 The Seventh Circuit however, stated, “[T]his 
argument . . . is specifically foreclosed by Johnson Controls, which 
explicitly recognized the applicability of the PDA to classifications 
based on “potential for pregnancy,” not just actual pregnancy.”147 In 
this respect, the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning is irreconcilable with the 
Eighth Circuit’s.148 However, the holdings of the two cases may still 
be distinguishable. Because the insurance plan at issue in Krauel 
excluded coverage for all infertility treatments,149 the Eighth Circuit 
could have decided the question by simply terming the exclusion a 
gender-neutral differentiation based on fertility.150      
The Seventh Circuit also diverges from the Eighth and Second 
at the point that those two Circuits begin to differentiate their facts 
from those of International Union. After noting that the International 
Union decision implicitly allows discrimination based on fertility 
under the PDA,151 the Eighth and Second Circuits take distinctive 
approaches to distinguishing International Union.152 The Eighth 
Circuit points out that the exclusion of surgical impregnation 
procedures in its case, unlike the fetal protection policy in 
International Union truly achieved gender neutrality—the policy 
refused to cover any infertility treatments, whether designed to treat 
                                                                                                                   
leave, and might become pregnant again.” At the time of the litigation, however, the 
women had not yet become pregnant. Id. 
146 Saks, 316 F.3d at 346. By expressly declining to consider whether an 
infertile female employee could state a claim under the PDA for an adverse 
employment action, the Second Circuit also declined to assert that potential 
pregnancy could never give rise to a cognizable PDA claim. Id. 
147 Hall, 534 F.3d. at 648, n.1. 
148 Id. The Seventh Circuit specifically refers to this aspect of the Eighth 
Circuit’s reasoning as “foreclosed by Johnson Controls.” Id. For additional 
discussion of the Eighth Circuit’s holding in Krauel, 95 F.3d at 674.  
149 Krauel, 95 F.3d at 678. 
150 See Int’l Union v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 198 (1991). 
151 Krauel, 95 F.3d at 679-680. 
152 Saks v. Franklin Covey, 316 F.3d 337, 345-346 (2d Cir. 2003); Krauel, 95 
F.3d at 680. 
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males or females and no matter what caused the infertility.153 The 
Second Circuit had a slightly more difficult time. The policy at issue 
in Saks, after all, did provide coverage for some infertility treatments. 
The Second Circuit concluded, however, that the employer’s insurance 
policy achieved gender neutrality by refusing to cover surgical 
impregnation procedures whether the procedure was used to treat male 
or female infertility.154 
In contrast, the Seventh Circuit determined that Hall mirrored 
the circumstances of International Union,155 employing the case in 
support of its argument that the PDA applies to potential pregnancy in 
general and to adverse employment actions arising from the pursuit of 
surgical impregnation procedures specifically.156 This inconsistency 
between the three cases creates two possibilities: either (1) either the 
Seventh Circuit or the Eighth and Second Circuits are incorrect, or (2) 
all three Circuits are correct and it is appropriate to view the pursuit of 
surgical impregnation procedures as a medical condition related to 
pregnancy in the context of adverse employment action while not 
conferring the same status in the context of insurance coverage.  
The Seventh Circuit observed no inconsistency in viewing an 
adverse employment action perpetrated due to an employee’s decision 
to undergo in vitro fertilization as a violation of Title VII as amended 
by the PDA, while simultaneously maintaining that there is no 
cognizable claim under the PDA against an employer who refuses to 
provide insurance coverage for surgical impregnation procedures.157 
The Seventh Circuit viewed the question addressed to it as 
fundamentally different from the question considered by the Eighth 
and Second Circuit.158  
The PDA, however, applies equally to discrimination in the 
form of adverse employment action and discrimination in the form of 
                                                 
153 Krauel, 95 F.3d at 680. 
154 Saks, 316 F.3d at 347. 
155 Hall v. Nalco, 534 F.3d 644, 647-648 (7th Cir. 2008). 
156 Id. at 648. 
157 Id. at 647-648.  
158 Id. at 646. 
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unequal benefits or dissimilar access to fringe benefit programs.159 In 
relevant part, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act states, 
 
[W]omen affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical 
conditions shall be treated the same for all employment related 
purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit 
programs, as other persons not so affected by similar in their 
ability or inability to work, and nothing in section 2000e-2(h) 
of this title shall be interpreted to permit otherwise.160 
 
The Act makes no distinction between discrimination through adverse 
employment action and discrimination through unequal provision of 
employment benefits. With respect to both adverse employment 
actions and benefits, discrimination on the basis of “pregnancy, 
childbirth, or related medical conditions,” is prohibited.161 Neither 
does the PDA provide any distinction between “related medical 
conditions” in the adverse employment action and “related medical 
conditions” in the benefits contexts.162  
Although the plain language of the PDA makes no distinction 
between the benefits and the adverse employment action contexts, 
infertility treatments would not be the first characteristic to be treated 
differently with respect to insurance coverage and adverse 
employment actions. Abortion is specifically exempted from the 
medical conditions for which an employer must provide medical 
insurance benefits.163 The PDA includes a provision reading,  
 
This subsection shall not require an employer to pay for health 
insurance benefits for abortion, except where the life of the 
mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term, 
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or except where medical complications have arisen from an 
abortion.164 
 
The Act makes no statement regarding the scope of protection offered 
to adverse employment actions perpetrated on the basis of an 
employee’s decision to receive an abortion.165 However, the Third 
Circuit and the Sixth Circuit have both concluded that adverse 
employment actions taken in response to an employee’s intent or 
decision to receive an abortion does give rise to a cognizable claim 
under the PDA.166  
Both Circuits supported their decisions with legislative history, 
and EEOC Guidelines. The Legislative History of the PDA provides: 
 
Because [the PDA] applies to all situations in which women 
are “affected by pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical 
conditions,” its basic language covers women who chose to 
terminate their pregnancies. This no employer may, for 
example, fire or refuse to hire a woman simply because she has 
exercised her right to have an abortion.167  
 
In addition, the House Conference Report on the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act suggests that women who chose to terminate a 
pregnancy are protected by the PDA. The Report states, “[N]o 
employer may, for example, fire or refuse to hire a woman simply 
because she has exercised her right to have an abortion.”168 Finally, 
the Third and Sixth Circuits relied on EEOC Guidelines promulgated 
in 1986. Those Guidelines indicate that abortion is a medical condition 
                                                 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
166 Doe v. C.A.R.S. Prot. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 358 (3d Cir. 2008); Turic v. 
Holland Hosp., 85 F. 3d 1211 (6th Cir. 1996). 
167 Turic, 85 F.3d at 1214 (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1786, 95th Cong., 
2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. pp. 4749, 4765-66.) 
168 H.R. Conf. Rep. 95-1786 (Oct. 13, 1978).  
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related to pregnancy in the limited context of adverse employment 
actions:  
 
The basic principle of the [PDA] is that women affected by 
pregnancy and related conditions must be treated the same as 
other applicants and employees on the basis of their ability or 
inability to work. A woman is therefore protected against such 
practices as being fired…merely because she is pregnant or has 
had an abortion.169 
 
The very specific discussion of abortion in the legislative history of 
the PDA and in the EEOC Guidelines provides an indication of 
Congressional intent on the issue.  
Given the unique treatment of abortion, it is not inconceivable 
that an employee’s pursuit of surgical impregnation would or would 
not give rise to a cognizable claim depending on the type of unequal 
treatment giving rise to claim. But abortion is accorded unique 
treatment precisely because it is a unique issue in the PDA context. 
Proponents of the PDA abortion exclusion provision strongly felt that 
“employers who are opposed to abortion should not be forced to, in 
effect, violate their personal moral conscience by financing payments 
for abortion.”170 Contemporary moral attitudes toward the use of 
infertility treatments would not seem to justify a specific exclusion for 
insurance coverage for surgical impregnation procedures.171 Although 
the specific language of the Act does not support the anomalous 
treatment of abortion, there is strong support in the legislative history 
of the PDA for doing so.172 There is no similar expression of 
Congressional intent with respect to surgical impregnation procedures, 
                                                 
169 Turic, 85 F.3d at 1213 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604 (1986)). 
170 Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 96th Cong., Legislative History 
of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, at 113 (Comm. Print 1980) 
171 But see Abel, supra note 93, at 849-850 (urging a more complete 
understanding of the moral and legal implications of infertility treatments before 
expanding PDA protection).  
172 See supra text accompanying notes 167-168. 
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which were not widely available in 1978 when Congress enacted the 
PDA.173  
Nevertheless, there is a logical distinction between infertility 
treatments in the context of insurance coverage and in the context of 
adverse employment action. The distinction relies upon the Seventh 
Circuit’s differentiation between childbearing capacity and fertility 
and is supported by the Supreme Court’s International Union. As the 
Supreme Court noted in City of L.A., Dept. of Water and Power v. 
Manhart, in the context of insurance benefits, “[t]reating different 
classes of risks as though they were the same for purposes of group 
insurance is a common practice that has never been considered 
inherently unfair.”174 So long as the insurance classification does not 
treat any person “in a manner which but for that person’s sex would be 
different,” there is no Title VII sex discrimination claim.175 An 
illustration of this reasoning occurs where an employer creates gender 
neutral distinctions between fertile and infertile individuals.176 So long 
as the distinction is truly gender neutral, the employer’s refusal to 
provide insurance coverage for infertility treatments can apply to men 
and women equally.177 In this circumstance, a woman may be 
potentially pregnant, but there is no differentiation on that basis. The 
class who suffers from the denial of fertility treatment insurance 
coverage includes men who are unable to father children as a result of 
their own infertility.178 Furthermore, consistent with the Supreme 
Court’s reasoning in Newport News, both the male and female 
employees bear the risk of their own infertility, and neither gender is 
                                                 
173 Van Voorhis, supra note 62, at 379 (noting the inception of IVF procedures 
in 1978 and its remarkable increase in use since). 
174 City of L.A., Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 710 
(1978).  
175 Id. at 711. 
176 See International Union v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 198 (1991). 
177 Bentley, supra note 10, at 394 (stating that statistically, 40% of all 
infertility cases are attributable to a female factor with a corresponding 40% of cases 
attributable to a male factor. The remaining 20% of infertility cases are attributable 
to a combination of male and female factors.) 
178 Saks v. Franklin Covey, 316 F.3d 337, 346 (2d Cir. 2003). 
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treated more favorably than another.179 Therefore, the exclusion of 
surgical impregnation procedures from insurance coverage can be 
gender neutral, depending on the accompanying provisions of the 
policy.180  
In addition, there may be good policy reason for excluding 
insurance coverage for infertility procedures. The cost of a single in 
vitro fertilization cycle runs from $7,000 to $10,000.181 Some 
estimates suggest that including coverage of fertility treatments in 
group health plans could increase the cost of these plans by as much as 
3-5%.182 Other sources argue that the estimated cost of comprehensive 
infertility treatment coverage is overstated and may amount to as little 
as $3.14 per employee, per year.183 In the past, the Supreme Court has 
been wary of allowing cost justifications to justify gender 
discrimination. For instance, in International Union, the Supreme 
Court refused to allow the increased cost associated with hiring 
members of a particular sex to justify gender discrimination.184 
However, the Supreme Court has not entirely foreclosed the possibility 
that financial concerns may be a weighty policy issue. In International 
Union, the Supreme Court carefully emphasized,  
 
We, of course, are not presented with, nor do we decide, a case in 
which costs would be so prohibitive as to threaten the survival of 
                                                 
179 Newport News v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 684 (1983). This approach raises 
the challenge, however, of ensuring that employer benefits plans are gender neutral 
both facially and in effect. For an argument that the Second Circuit wrongly 
determined that the Franklin Covey insurance plan avoided gender discrimination 
and that coverage exclusion of infertility treatments disparately impacts women, see 
Pendo, supra note 65, at 336-340.  
180 Saks, 316 F.3d at 346. 
181 Tarun Jain, Bernard L. Harlow, & Mark D. Hornstein,, Insurance Coverage 
and Outcomes of In Vitro Fertilization, 347 NEW ENG. J. MED. 661, 661 (2002).  
182 Insure.com, Paying the Price for Infertility, 
http://www.insure.com/articles/healthinsurance/infertility-price.html (last visited 
Dec. 11, 2008).  
183 Pendo, supra note 65, at 341. 
184 Int’l Union v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 210-11 (1991). 
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the employer’s business. We merely reiterate our prior holding 
that the incremental cost of hiring women cannot justify 
discriminating against them.185 
  
If the costs of providing infertility treatments such as surgical 
impregnation procedures prove to be so costly as to force businesses to 
close their doors, the Supreme Court could determine that policy 
concerns excuse unequal treatment in this regard.  
In contrast, adverse employment action due to an employee’s 
intent to undergo surgical impregnations procedures cannot claim the 
same gender neutrality.186 Males may participate in the procedure by 
providing sperm, and male infertility may cause the need for the 
procedure,187 but only the female can undergo the procedure and only 
the female will bear the risk of adverse employment action arising 
from absences from work.188 As a result, “Employees terminated for 
taking time off to undergo IVF—just like those terminated for taking 
time off to give birth or receive other pregnancy-related care—will 
always be women.”189 As a result, the class is no longer gender 
neutral, and the woman who experiences an adverse employment 
action as the result of taking time off to undergo fertility treatments 
can state a cognizable claim under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 
although a woman who is denied insurance coverage for the same 
treatment may not have a claim.190 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
The Seventh Circuit’s novel decision in Hall v. Nalco, though 
employing a murky distinction between childbearing capacity and 
infertility and seeming to contradict the decisions of the Eighth and 
                                                 
185 Id. 
186 Hall v. Nalco, 534 F.3d 644, 649 (7th Cir. 2008). 
187 Bentley, supra note 10, at 397. 
188 Hall, 534 F.3d at 648-649. 
189 Id. 
190 Id. at 649. 
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Second Circuits, is nonetheless correct in its determination that an 
employee who is terminated for taking time off to undergo in vitro 
fertilization treatments states a cognizable claim under the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act. The holding neither requires employers to begin 
providing insurance coverage for infertility treatments nor to provide 
special accommodations to women attempting to become pregnant 
through reproductive technology.191 The decision simply requires an 
employer to treat absence resulting from infertility treatments like any 
other non-occupational disability for sake of hirings, firings, and other 
employment actions. 
 
                                                 
191 The Pregnancy Discrimination Act does not require employers to make it 
easier for women to work. California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 
272, 286-287 (1987). Rather, the PDA simply requires employers to treat pregnant 
and potentially pregnant workers in the same manner that they treat “similarly 
affected but non-pregnant workers.” Troupe v. May Dept. Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 
738 (7th Cir. 1994). See also Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 96th 
Cong., Legislative History of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, at 83 
(Comm. Print 1980) (“The touchstone of compliance is equality of treatment, and 
any policy which affects pregnancy, childbirth, or related conditions must apply 
equally to other types of disabling conditions as well.”) But see Daniela M. de la 
Piedra, Flirting with the PDA: Congress must Give Birth to Accommodation Rights 
that Protect Pregnant Working Women, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 275 (2008) 
(arguing that employees experiencing pregnancy-related limitations should not be 
denied accommodations due to pregnancy-blind policies). 
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